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NOTES

THE USES AND LIMITATIONS OF THE WRIT OF
CAPIAS AD SATISFACIENDUM IN PENNSYLVANIA
The satisfaction of a judgment by execution upon the person of the judgment
debtor recently received national attention when the press publicized the fates
of two defendants in automobile negligence actions in Vermont who were imprisoned for two and fifteen months respectively after an adverse judgment.
The process of the law by which they were incarcerated, and the fact that technically they faced life imprisonment, were the subjects of much criticism. 1 Execution on
the body of the judgment debtor by a writ of capias ad salisfacienduin was once
a common but rather impracticable form of execution, and can be used today in
Pennsylvania, although it has been curtailed by statute and decision in the scope
of its application.
The writ commands the sheriff to take the party named, and keep him safely, so that he may have his body before the court on a certain day, to satisfy the
party for whom it is issued, the damages or debt and damages recovered by the
judgment. It is to be compared with the writ of rapiasad respondendum by which
the defendant was brought before the court to answer the plaintiff's claim. It is
from the latter writ that the writ of capias ad satisfaciendum developed. Because
the civil action of trespass was criminal in origin, the defendant being liable to
the king for a breach of the peace, after the year 1250 arrest of the defendant as
a mesne process by capias ad respondendum became common in trespass actions.2
Arrest for debt was not introduced until 1267, when it was authorized in an action
of account. The development ol? a commercial society made the extension of civil
arrest to all forms of debt actions inevitable. In 1352 the writ of capias was extended to the actions of debt, detinue and replevin, and in 1503 to actions on the case
which included assumpsit.3 By decision in the reign of Edward III it was laid down
that in those actions which might be commenced by a writ of capias ad respondendum a writ of capiasad satisfaciendum could be used to execute the judgment.
This resulted in imprisonment for debt becoming a general method of execution in England.' The oppression of honest debtors and the barbaric treatment
they received at the hands of their creditors and the courts is a black page in the
history of that nation. It has been observed that the Quakers who settled in Pennsylvania did not exhibit the same enlightenment towards their debtors as they
displayed toward their criminals, for the system of imprisonment for debt was
imported into Pennsylvania substantially the same as it existed in England.6
I New York Times, May 19, 58:7 May 20, 23:5; May 21, 6:7; May 22, 65:2 May 26,
32:4. Also see Life Magazine, June 6, 1949, p. 60.
2 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND'S HIsToay OF ENGLISH LAW
3 8 HOLDSWORTH'S HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 231 (1926).

4 Ibid.
6 Freedman, Imprisonment for Debt, 2

TEMs

LI

LAw

592 (1895).

QUARTERLY

330 (1929).

This

article contains a much more thorough discussion of the English and Pennsylvania development of
imprisonment for debt.
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The Act of 1836 gives a judgment creditor in Pennsylvania the right
to execute his judgment upon the personal and real estate of the defendant, and
if he has neither, to execute upon the person of the defendant by writ of capias ad
satisfaciendum.8 The writ cannot be issued on a judgment for a sum less than
one hundred dollars, 7 and cannot be executed where the defendant has any realty
or personalty sufficient to satisfy the judgment. It may be issued for any portion
of the unsatisfied judgment after the defendant's assets have been sold.8
In 1842 the legislature abolished imprisonment of the person in any civil
action for the recovery of any money due upon any judgment or decree founded
on an express or implied contract or for damages for non-performance of any
contract.9 This great step forward in social reform was anticipated by a provision
relating to assignments by insolvents in the Constitution of 1776, § 28, where
it was provided that "the person of a debtor where there is no strong presumption
of fraud, shall not be continued in prison, after delivery up, bona fide, all his
estate real and personal for the use of his creditors." This section of the Constitution of 1776 is included with slightly different wording in the Constitution
of 1874, Article 1, § 16. This provision was the result of pressure brought by the
poorer classes during the years immediately preceding the drafting of the Constitution to alleviate the intolerable situation of those debtors imprisoned in Pennsylvania jails. 10 The Act of 1842 continuing the policy announced by the Constitution has been described as "one of those great landmarks of legislation which
point not only to a great change in the law, but also to a great reolution in popular sentiment and manners."'" It might be noted here that imprisonment for
debt was not finally abolished in England until 1869.12
The Act of 1842 contains a number of exceptions to its operation, and is
limited to actions based upon contractual liability. Thus a writ of capias ad satisfaciendum may be used today to enforce a judgment in an action ex delicto for
negligence l 3 or an intentional tort. 14 Malice is not an essential element in the
cause of action for thi writ to issue. The writ has been used to enforce judgments
in actions of slander' and for conspiracy and fraudulent conversion.' 8 Defendants have tried in several cases to put an adverse judgment in a tort action within
6 Act of June 16, 1836, P. L. 755 119, 12 P. S. 2111 (Pa.).
7 Act of June 16, 1836, P. L. 755 130, as amended by Act of June 12, 1931, P. L. 558, No.

190 i1, 12 P. S. 2142 a and b (Pa.).
8 Act of June 16, 1836, P. L. 755 128, 12 P. S. 2142 (Pa.).

P Act of July
11 Hammer v.

12, 1842, P. L. 339 1, 12 P. S. 257.

10 SELSAM, THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION OF 1776 (.1936), p. 203.

Ladner, 17 Phila. 315 (1884).
12 Debtors Act, 1869, 32 and 33 Victoria c. 62 14. Imprisonment of the defendant as a mesne
process was abolished in 1838 by the Judgments Act, 1 and 2 Victoria c. 110i§1.
18 Romberger v. Henry, 167 Pa. 314, 31 A. 634 (1895) ;Kubit v. Witt, 127 Pa. Super. 434,
193 A. 81 (1937).

14 Powell v.Perkins, 211 Pa. 283, 60 A. 731 (1905).
15 Mankey v. Stocking, 213 Pa. 299, 62 A. 913 (1906).
16 Kalbfus v. Rundell, 134 Pa. 102, 19 A. 492 (1890).
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the scope of the Act of 1842 by showing that the relationship between themselves
and the plaintiff was founded in contract. The courts have said that such a recital
of a contract or the fact that a contract existed between the parties is not sufficient
to place an action clearly ex delicto within the prohibitions of the statute, and a
writ of capias ad satisfaciendum may issue to enforce a judgment recovered in
17
the action.
In those situations where the plaintiff may have an election between an
action of trespass or assumpsit, 'the cases on the subject of imprisonment during
the action generally hold that the plaintiff's election to proceed ex delicto does not
deprive the defendant of any rights he might have had if the action were brought
ex contractu.18 The best example of such a cause, and the one occurring most
frequently in the cases, is an action on a contract induced by fraud. The plaintiff
may bring a tort action for deceit or he may sue for breach of warranty in assumpsit. A writ of capias ad respondendum will not lie to bring the defendant into
court merely because the plaintiff chooses to frame his action ex delicto. The proper
form is a warrant of arrest provided by the Act of 1842 to commence an action
on a contract tinged with fraud. 1 9 But when the facts present the requisite elements for a tort action of deceit, a judgment recovered in that form may be enforced by use of a writ of capias ad satisfaciendum.2o The necessary scienter presumedly has been shown at trial, and the action is clearly ex delicto although arising from a contract. In Condon v. Fessler21 it was said that where a capias ad
tespondendum would not issue to bring the defendant into court, it would seem
illogical that a capias ad satisfaciendum should issue to enforce the judgment. The
rule in an action on a fraudulent representation is quite logical, since in one case
the plaintiff has merely averred deceit arising from a contract, perhaps to defeat
the Act of 1842, and in tht case of execution by capias ad satisfaciendum, he has
proved it. When the action is clearly one of tort for deceit and there is no element
of contract involved, both capias ad respondendum and capias ad satisfaciendum
22
may be used.
Wh-ere a defendant's liability is vicariously derived from the acts of another,
the judgment may be enforced by arrest under a capias writ.2 8 The case of Baxter
v. Wunder involved the responsibility of one partner for the torts of another, but
the court included within the scope of the rule the responsibility of a master for
the torts of his servant. There was no distinction, according to the court, between
torts committed personally and those committed by an agent. As far as a money
17 Dungan v. Read, 167 Pa. 393, 31 A. 639 (1895); Kalbfus v. Rundell, supra.
18 Brown v. Burdick, 3 Clark 226 (1845) ; Hammer v. Ladner, 17 Phila. 315 (1884) ; Alexander

v. Goldstein, 13 Pa. Super. 518 (1900); Koehler v. Woodford, 1 D. & C. 784 (1922).
19 Act of July 12, 1842, P. L 339 1§2 and 3, P. S. 258 and 259 (Pa.).
20 Howard v. McKee, 82 Pa. 409 (1876) ; DeTurk v. Gachenbach, 96 Pa. Super. 38 (1929).
21 15 D. & C. 507 (1931).
22 Tyron v. Hassinger, 1 Clark 184 (1843); Bager v. Radley, 1 Phila. 47; Hirsch v. Simpson,
16 Phila. 85 (1882).
28 Baxter v. Wunder, 89 Pa. Super. 585 (1926).
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judgment is concerned this is the wl established rule and there is no doubt that
the Act of 1836 makes no distinction as to the source of liability in allowing
execution on the person, but to allow the enigmatic doctrine of respondeatsuperior to deprive the master of his freedom for the acts of his servant is not within
reason, even if the deprivation is relatively short. One might justify the imprisonment of the tort-feasor on the basis that one who acts negligently or commits
an intentional tort must be prepared to accept the consequences of liability which
include imprisonment for failure to pay any judgment, and on the basis of an
uncertain moral guilt, which does not approach a crime in many instances with
its attendant safeguards over the liberty of the individual, but which is none the
less culpable. But the imprisoning of one who is held liable as a matter of policy and
not for the consequences of his owp act cannot be so justified. In cases of vicarious
liability the courts have refused to issue a writ of capias'adrespondendum to commence the action.2 4 The argument there was even stronger against it, since the
master's liability would not be established until judgment.
A judgment in an action to enforce contribution between joint tort-feasors
cannot be executed by a writ of capias ad satisfaciendum. The liability is contractual since it arises from an implied agreement to jointly contribute for the wrong
6
done, and is therefore within the scope of the Act of 1842.2
Enforcement of a foreign judgment, whether recovered in an action of tort or
contract, is had by suing in assumpsit on the judgment debt in the state where execution is sought. Supposing the cause to be one where a capias ad satisfaciendum
might have issued in the first instance, had it been pursued in this state, can the
plaintiff now have a capias to execute the judgment recovered in assumpsit on the
judgment ex delicto? The only Pennsylvania case holds that since the action is
ex contractu, a capias ad satisfaciendum cannot be used to execute such a judgment.2 6 Now if the courts are seeking a logical consistency as they did in the case
of Baxter v. Wunder, and if they will look to the substance of the action in determining whether the writ will issue, as they do in so many other cases, there
is no reason why a capias should not be used to execute a tort judgment enforced
in this state by an action of assumpsit. The merging of the original cause of action
into the judgment and the suit upon the higher obligation should not destroy
any advantages to which the plaintiff was entitled with respect to the original
cause of action.2 7 The suit in assumpsit is to enforce an obligation imposed by
law, and is not a suit within the meaning of the Act of 1842, which prohibits
imprisonment for suits on "contracts express or implied."
The Act of 1842 excepts from its operation a number of actions which might
be considered judgments or decrees ex contracta. Proceedings for contempt to
24
25
26
21

Mason v. Sabulsky, 20 D. & C. 355 (1934).
Feldman v. Gomes, 98 Pa. Super. 84 (1929).
Condon v. Fessler, 15 D. & C. 507 (1930).
RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS §47, comment d (1942).
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enforce civil remedies are excepted so that the right of a court of equity to enforce
its decrees by attachment of the person is not abridged, although where the only offense is a failure to pay money due on a contract, the courts have adopted the spirit
of the Act of 1842 and have not allowed attachment of the person of the defendant.28 A judgment for fines or penalties can be enforced by the use of a writ of
capias ad satisfaciendum, and this includes p'enalties for the commission of acts
forbidden by the state" and by muncipal ordinance.3 0 This imprisonment is
admittedly a penal infliction and not based upon contract.
A judgment recovered in an action for breach of promise to marry is expressly excepted from the operation of the Act of 1842. Such actions are now barred in
Pennsylvania by a statute expressing a strong public policy against them.8 ' The
exception might be of force, however, in regards to a foreign judgment on such
a cause from a jurisdiction where they are recognized, since the full faith and credit
clause of the federal Constitution requires enforcement of a valid money judgment
of a sister state even though it would have been contrary to the public policy of the
enforcing state to allow action on the original claim.8 2
Since actions on moneys collected by any public officers are excepted from
the Act of 1842, the following definition of a public officer within the purview of
the statute was necessary:
"... all persons who, by authority of law, are intrusted with the receipt
of public moneys, through whose hands money due to the public or belonging to it, passes on its way to the public treasury, must be so considered, by whatever name or title they may be designated in the law
authorizing their appointment, and whether the service be special or
general, transient or permanent." 88
A judgment recovered in an action ex contractu or ex delicto for misconduct
or neglect in office or in any professional employment can be enforced by a writ
of capias ad satisfaciendum, these causes being excepted by the statute. The question then is what constitutes misconduct or neglect in office or professional employment. Failure of an attorney to pay over to his client money collected for him
is clearly such misconduct,8 4 but failure of a clergyman to hand over money entrusted to him for safekeeping is not, since the keeping of money is not within the
professional employment of a clergyman. 8 Execution by writ of capias ad satisfaciendum could probably have been had in the latter case if the action had been
ex delicto.
28
29

Commonwealth ex. rel. Di Giacomo v. Heston, 292 Pa. 63, 140 A. 533 (1928).
Commonwealth ex. rel. Colbert v. Kerr, 32 A. 276 (1895).

80 Milton Borough v. Hoagland, 3 Pa. Co. Cts. 283 (887).

81 Act of June 22, 1935, P. L. 450 82, 48 P. S. 171 (Pa.).
82 BEALE, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, p. 1413 (1935).
88 Sharswood, J. in Commonwealth v. Evans, 74 Pa. 124 (1873).
84 Wills v. Kane, 2 Grant's Cases 59 (1853).
85 Emerich v. McDevitt, 19 Pa. Co. Cts. 53 (1897).
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Arrest of the defendant to enforce a judgment indudes the right to arrest
for the costs accruing in the action since the costs follow the judgment. But a
separate judgment for costs is merely a debt and cannot be enforced by writ of
capias ad satidsaciendum, even if recovered by the defendant in a tort action.S6

A defendant may be exempt from arrest to enforce a judgment not because
of the nature of the cause against him, but because the defendant is privileged from
arrest. By the Act of 1842 a female cannot be imprisoned for her debts," and
by the Act of 1893 a married woman could not be arrested or imprisoned for
her torts."8 This leaves a single woman liable to imprisonment for her torts. The
federal government has accorded immunity from civil arrest to certain diplomatic
officials by virtue of the rule of international law that foreign officials are immune
from the domestic laws of the nation to whom they are accredited. Election officials
and electors, legislators and Congressmen are exempt from arrest while carrying
on official business. Parties and witnesses in a judicial proceeding carried on in
good faith are also immune from civil arrest. 89
If imprisonment for the debt is not forbidden and the defendant is not
privileged from arrest, the writ of capias ad satisfaciendum issues from a court
of record and commands the sheriff to take the defendant and safely keep him
so that the sheriff will have the body in court on the return day to satisfy the
plaintiff. The plaintiff can have a writ of fieri facias and a capias ad satifaciendum

issued at the same time if he desires, 40 and the sheriff can confront the defendant with both writs. The writ of capias cannot be executed when the defendant
has realty, but if he fails to disclose to the sheriff the existence of any property,
then the sheriff can execute the writ of capiasad satisfaciendum. Therein lies one
of the uses of the writ, for the prospect of arrest is of great persuasive force in
inducing a recalcitrant debtor to disclose his assets. The plaintiff cannot execute
both writs, however.
If arrest is made under the writ, the defendant is committed to the county
jail. If the return is non est inventus, that the defendant is not found within the
county, the plaintiff may issue a testatum capias into a different county4' or an
alias writ in the same county.
What is the defendant's fate once he is imprisoned under the writ? He can,
of course, pay the judgment and be released or he may choose to remain in jail.
The imprisonment of the debtor was at common law the highest satisfaction known,
and only death or the creditor could release him. By statute in Pennsylvania, when
the defendant dies in prison or is discharged at his own request (either by person36 Lane v. Baker, 2 Grant's Cases 424 (1853).

87
88
8
40
41

Act of Feb. 8, 1819, P. L 57, 12 P. S. 255 (Pa.).
Act of June 8, 1893, P. L. 344, 48 P. S. 11I (Pa.).
5 CORPUS Julus 388.
Act of June 16, 1836, P. L. 755 127, 12 P. S. 2141 (Pa).
Act of June 16, 1836, P. L 755 181, 12 P. S. 263 (Pa).
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ally requesting the plaintiff to discharge him or by petitioning for a discharge
under the insolvency laws) or by reason of privilege, or escapes, the judgment
is deemed satisfied by the arrest, but the plaintiff can have his remedies at law as
if the capias had not been issued.' 2 But when the plaintiff discharges the defendant on his own motion, the debt is extinguished and the judgment satisfied.' 8
The imprisoned debtor can petition the court for discharge under the insolvency laws. The Act of 1901" is the general insolvency law of Pennsylvania and
is in effect insofar as it does not conflict with the Federal Bankruptcy Act, so that
it controls the discharge of an imprisoned debtor. The debtor must make an assignment for the benefit of his creditors and present his petition to the court seeking
a rule to show cause why he should not be discharged from arrest. The debtor
can be released by posting a bond, pending the hearing on the rule. Notice must
be given to the plaintiff and to the defendant's creditors of the date set for the
hearing. Upon the hearing of the rule, the petitioner must answer all the questions put to him and present his books for examination. If it appears to thu court
that the petitioner has made an assignment for the benefit of his creditors, that
he has not violated any provisions of the insolvency laws, and that all daims against
him would be discharged by the creditors accepting a dividend, the court should
discharge him from arrest.
If the plaintiff's action is based on an intentional tort such as deceit or
fraud, libel, slander, malicious prosecution, conspiracy, seduction or criminal
conversation or those involving "actual force," a judgment based on such action
would not be barred by the plaintiff's accepting a dividend and, therefore, the
defendant could not be released under the Act of 1901.11 According to the statute
he may then be imprisoned for not more than ninety days since he has not com46
plied with the provisions of the act.
The Act of 191547 was passed to provide for those situations where 'the imprisoned defendant is without assets to assign. The procedure is basically the
same under this act as under the Act of 1901. If the court is satisfied at the hearing on the rule that the defendant has no property or means to pay the judgment
and has not secreted or assigned his property to avoid payment, the court may
discharge him. Such discharge does not affect the plaintiff's judgment in any
way, whereas a discharge under the Act of 1901 bars the plaintiff from further
action on the claim. Under the Act of 1915 no defendant who has complied with
the requirements of the insolvency laws can be detained for more than sixty days.

42
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45
46
47

Act of June 16, 1836, P. L. 755 181, 12 P. S. 2143 (Pa.).
Bamford v. Keefer, 66 Pa. 389 (1870).
Act of June 4, 1901, P. L. 404 15, 39 P. S. 4-8 (Pa.).
Act of June 4, 1901, P. L 404 183, 12 P. S. 100 (Pa).
Act of June 4, 1901, P. L. 404 15, 39 P. S. 5 (Pa.).
Act of June 1, 1915, P. L. 704 11, 39 P. S. 9-12 (Pa.).
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At one time the courts said that discharge under the Act of 1915 before sixty
days expired was a matter of grace within the discretion of the court, and after sixty
days a matter of right.4 The statute reads, "the court may discharge him from
arrest," which was construed as leaving the matter within the discretion of the
court, subject only to review for its abuse. In Miller's Petition49 it was held that
such discretion allowing imprisonment up to sixty days violated Article I, §
16 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, referred to before, which says that the debtor
who has delivered up his estate for the benefit of his creditors shall not be continued in prison. The only discretion provided for by the act is whether or not there
is any evidence of the debtor's secreting his property, and if the debtor places
himself within the terms of the act he is entitled to releas'e, not as a matter of
grace, but by mandate of the statute.
If the defendant has made no assignment or has not attempted to pay the
debt there is apparently no time limit on his incarceration. A defendant without
property may be released upon proof of this fact, without prejudice to the plaintiff's claim by operation of the Act of 1915. In a negligence action an assignment
of whatever property the defendant has frees him by the Act of 1901, but for those
actions in which the assignment by the defendant does not bar the plaintiff's claim,
the defendant must remain in prison for not more than ninety days. His release
thereafter does not bar the claim of the plaintiff, since it is considered a release
by operation of law or at request of the defendant and not a release with the consent of the plaintiff, so that the plaintiff may have his remedy as if no capias had
been issued. The conclusion to be drawn from this summary is that the period
of up to ninety days which the defendant must serve in the latter instance becomes
punitive in nature. The judgment is not satisfied, and the assignment by the defendant in good faith has been futile. Punishment by incarceration is not within
the realm of a civil action.
Comment on the use of the writ of capias ad satisfaciendum to enforce judgments has generally been unfavorable. Civil arrest has been described as a barbaric
relic of another era unbecoming to our civilization and, in arguments less emotional,
a legal process better left to criminal courts where the interests of society and not
the individual are to be protected. Viewing the use of the writ as a punitive measure
or as satisfaction of a judgment, these opinions are not without merit.
It is submitted, however, that in Pennsylvania civil arrest following judgment sverves a useful purpose, and one for which its continued existence can be
justified. In most cases, with the exception of certain implications of the Act of
1901 mentioned above, the philosophy that a capias is to be used to punish the
defendant is long gone. It'is today an inducement to pay a judgment.
49

Ostrowke's Petition, 79 Pa. Super. 311 (1922).

49 119 Pa. Super. 283, 180 A. 904 (1935).
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The legislation and the cases commented upon have shown this purpose.
If the defendant has property or means to pay his obligation and does so he may
not be d'eprived of his liberty. If he has neither and convinces the court of this fact,
he may be freed since imprisonment cannot induce payment in such a situation.
When the defendant has some property but is insolvent, his situation is somewhat
less favocable since even by assigning all his property certain claims are not barred
and he cannot be freed, In keeping with the view taken of civil arrest after judgment as an inducement to pay, the better practice under the Act of 1901 would
be to allow the assigning defendant his freedom immediately, despite the fact that
the claim would not be barred under other sections of the insolvency laws. The
plaintiff's judgment remains enforceable after release as under the Act of 1915.
Detention achieves nothing except punishment by deprivation of liberty, a criminal
philosophy of doubtful practical value. The foregoing assumes an honest defendant, but when the judgment debtor secretes property or refuses to take available
steps to satisfy a just obligation, nothing is better than confinement behind bars
to change his views.
Imprisonment for all debt in its. broadest sense is indeed a relic of another
day. The exigencies of a commercial world required that businessmen could incur honest debts without fear of imprisonment as an incident of liability. To allow
otherwise would seriously hinder an economy based on a free flow of credit. By
the same token, those who fraudulently avoid their obligations are not and should
not be protected.
But our modern society by no means demands that imprisonment of a financially able tort-feasor should be abolished, if the imprisonment is only a means
to the satisfaction by payment of that financial liability which the law creates in
the tort-feasor because of his power to interfere with the rights of others. As to
the negligent tort-feasor, the deadliness of a machine age justifies this incident
of liability as a caution to those who would proceed without providing a method
of satisfying the claims of those whom they wrong.
If imprisonment by capias is considered as an inducement to satisfy financial
liability, and as incidental thereto, at first glance the views b'efore expressed
on the arrest of a master for the torts of his servant seem inconsistent. The master
is not being punished nor is execution being had upon his body, but he is merely
being induced to pay his obligation, and if he cannot, then he should be freed.
This more modern attitude, however, cannot refute the arguments against such
arrest as discussed above in considering the case of Baxter v. Wunder. We are
justifying what exists under our law on the basis of the power liability concept,
and a different approach to an established legal process cannot justify imprisonment of the master based on liability for a power existing in another person, the
servant. Financial liability without the incident of imprisonment as an inducement
to pay is a matter of policy and the deep pocket, but deprivation of liberty for the
acts of another remains unreasonable under any view.

204
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Abuse by a vindictive plaintiff of the right to use a capias is, of course, always
possible. Under any philosophy by which one views the writ, the deprivation of the
liberty of an individual is to be guarded closely. Imprisonment of a breadwinner
of small means is a hardship often resulting in loss of employment and if the
capias is ineffective to induce payment such hardship should be immediately alleviated. The rights of a defendant seem to be fully protected by constitutional provisions and by tWe view of the courts that the use of a capias ad satisfaciendum is an
extraordinary remedy which is abhorrent to the courts of this state.
HOWELL C. METrE

